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Smith: The politics of values

If present-day dissidents are to
reclaim the belief that values are best
conceived empirically, they should
begin by considering the imposition
controversy as a possible dispute over
the means to be used in schooling.

The politics
of values
by P.L. Smith
The Ohio State University

The period of the 1930s was one of extreme tur·
bulence In American life . Capitalism seemed to be Im·
potent In the face of massive economic collapse. Even
democracy was bei ng challenged. It looked to many as If
personal freedom were incompatible with the demands of
equality. The realities of the twentieth century were forcing the American tradition of liberty to give way to group
conceptions of human rights and responsibilities. Matters
appeared even worse with the loss of faith in reform. The
1920s had shown the futility of the earlier progressive
movement and revealed liberalism as an ally of the status
quo. For those W'ho rejected the established order and
wished to hasten Its passing, radical action was the only
acceptable response.•
Such was the atmosphere in which the founders of
progressive education were forced to confront a long·
standing anomaly in their thought. Can virtue be taught, or
must It somehow be imposed? Progressive educational
thinkers were never quite clear or consistent In trying to
answer this question. On the one hand, they recognized
that values were im portant and that education must foster
the good, but, on the other hand, they did not think that It
was ever wise to force others to accept a particular value
orientation.
The Normative Thrust of Progressive Education
More precisely, the founders of progressive
education revered democracy as a way of life and saw
deliberate education as the most effective means f0< transmitting democratic values in an urban industrial society.
When asked why they so revered democracy as a way of
life, progressive thinkers had a ready answer. They
believed that It supplied the necessary and sufficient
· con
ditions for scientific intelligence, or, put In negative terms,
for non.formalist thinking. And what was the value of
non·formallst thinking? Progressives believed It was two·
fold, both Instrumental and intrinsic. It was Instrumental
In solving practical problems and thereby contributing to

human survival. It was intrinsic In contributing to human
welfare and improving the quality of Ille. This belief in the
inherent value of scientific intel ligence is rarely understood or appreciated by the critics of progressive
education. But those who conceived the movement were
convinced that the ultimate value In non-formalist thinking
and, thus, in democracy itself, as a way of life, was found
in the fact that it created and developed the capacities to
think and to experience human emotions . Without these
capacities human beings are essentially the same as other
living things. But with them, they are unique; they possess
the necessary tools for deliberately converting the hostile
forces of nature lo human advantage. And of even greater
significance, these powers of mind have intrin sic value
because they provide the source of human culture and the
foundations of human dignlly. Progressive thinkers were
humanists by Inclination and naturalists by philosophy.
Given their convictions and their belief that the realization
of human mental potential was tied to democratic living by
empirical necessity, it is easy to understand the normative
thrust of progressive education .
However, acoompanying this thrust was abhorrence o_f indoctrination. Regardless of motivation,
progressive thinkers eschewed all forms of imposition.
Here, too, they had a reason. Indoctrination or imposition
was seen as contrary to democracy. In so being it stifled
the growth of scientific intelligence. And this, in turn, had
the dual effect of decreasing the chances of survival and
detracting from the quality of life. By itself, the rejection
of indoctrination or imposition In the educational en ·
terprise of schooling may not seem Incompatible with the
acceptance of a normative thrus t in schooling. But there
was a kicker in this mix.
Progressive educational thinkers rejected the
Aristotelian idea of development from within. They were
unanimous in the belief that the cultivation of human
nature was not enough. On the progressive view human
nature Is virtually created by natural forces; and If it Is to
be created intelligently, it must be understood and controlled by the only source of l ntelligen~ there Is, man
himself. But ii there is no guarantee, if, Indeed, it is
unlikely that human beings will develop in desirable ways
without human control of the process of development;
and ii the individual or individuals being educated cannot
be expected to possess the capacities to understand or
control this process, at least at the start, as virtually
everyone, including progressive thinkers, will admit, how
in the world can indoctrination or Imposition be avoided;
assuming, of course, we should all develop in desirable
ways?
Progressive Education In the Limelight
The failure of progressive education to provide a clear
and decisive answer to this question represents a serious
soft-spot in its theoretical posture. So long as
progressives were on the offensive, attacking the enemy,
"traditional education" or "formalist educational
thinking," this soft-spot was hard to detect, and was easy
to avoid even when recognized. Supporters believed that
the opposition had a strong Ideological hold on public
thinking, and that this hold had to be broken before the
progressive alternative could be completely spelled out.
But by the 1920s the victory was pretty much won.
Traditional education was In considerable disrepu te, at
least theoretically. The immediate effect was to produce
an intellectual vacuum. Theoretical Issues were simply
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not seen as Important. Peop le were intellectually free to
think pretty much what they liked. So tong as they were
doing something and claimed guidance from some
rationale, they were effectively left alone to func tion as
their own ph ilosophical critics.
But the press of events soon brought this period to an
end. And the 1930s were to change the role of the
progressive trad ition in American life. Eyes were no longer
solely on the opposition. There were real and serious
problems to be faced, probl ems that threatened the
welfare of everyone. If what had been accepted
theretofore could not provide solutions to these
problems, people were ready to consider alternatives. The
mood was at least congenial to the practical examination
of new ideas. Where old ways would not work, new ways
would be encouraged. What could be better for the type of
education that was founded on the philosophy of ex·
perimentallsm?
Bui with this newfound status came critical
exam ination, and, more specifically, self-examination by
proponents who were at last put on the spot to produce on
their promise. If their theory of education was to be finally
accepted, It would have to meet the test, theoretically as
well as prac tically, supplied by the realities of the
depression. Progressive education was finally on the hot
seat. If it had weaknesses, they would soon be apparent.
And once apparent they could not be ignored. Progressive
educa
tional
thinkers began to polish up their Idea in order
to present a defensible,
ed
unifi
and effective front to a
beleaguered and eager, but still demand ing, public.

1

The Official View on Imposition
The progressives were soon to disc over that on the
question of imposi tion they could not present the type of
front they desired. Indeed, there arose a controversy that
revealed the aforementioned soft-spot or anomaly in their
thinking. There was, it should be said, an "official
position" on this Issue, but it could hardly be described as
acceptable to everyone, or even acceptable to the majority
of those who shaped opinion in progressive education .
The official view was the one given by John Dewey
and supported so ad mirably by Boyd H. Bode and William
H. Kilpatrick. Dewey claimed that education need never
rely on Imposition, even when concerned with li fe's basic
orientation. He agreed that education must work to transmit the values of democracy, and must thereby foster
, but he
particular dispositions about and towards reality
insisted, nonetheless, that school uld
learning co
be
purelyerimental.
exp
Teachers could avoid indoctrination
and still be effective.
Indeed, Indoctrination was seen as an obstacle to effective school Ing in a democratic society. In a democratic
society effective schooling provides a democratic orientation to life. Indoctri nation either fails to give any orien·
talion at all, or else brings about an orientation that is
Inherently undemocratic. Accord ing to this otticlal vi ew, a
democratic orientation to life can only be provided by
means that are themselves democratic. Indoctrination
was believed to be anti-democratic. It was said to hinder
personal development and destroy the roots of genuine
community. With this position, I here was virtually no hope
that schooling under indoc trination could effectively
foster understanding and acceptance of democratic
dispositions.
Why were supporters of this official view so adamant
in relating educational means to educational ends? The
FALL, 1978
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answer Is not hard to find, although it Is amazing how few
have found it. In the first place, they justified a democratic
orien tation because it contributed to mental development.
If In the process o f acquiring a democratic conception of
reality there was no advancement of mental capacities, as
there surety would not be under conditions of indoctrination, then supporters of the official view would
have been less enthusiastic about democracy as a way
of life. But In the second place, and more Import
antly,
they did not believe that a democratic orientation could
be acquired save through intelligence. Democratic
d ispositions were said to be founded on intefllgent seffselection. While they may contribute to mental development, they also presuppose Intelligence in both their un·
on
ders tanding and acceptance. Wit h a democratic orien·
tali we can foster mental growth; but only by reaching a
certain point In mental development can we acquire a
democratic orientation .
Dissenters from the olficial view saw this position as
paradoxical . But supporters would say that it only appears
paradoxical if we assume that things exist prior to
relations, that is, only if we presuppose that intelligence
and a democratic orientation must exist independently
and before they are interconnected . But in fact, sup·
porters would say, this is simply no t so . Both come about
as a result of an evo lutionary process wherein the reality
and character of each is a result of its transactions wi th
the other. Here, democratic values and mental capacities
are assumed to be mutually dependent. Each is a
necessary condition for the other. As we become more intelligent, we are made increasingly aware of democracy as
a way of life, and as we come lo see democracy as a way o f
life, we are, by that very fact, made more Intelligent. Each
is instrumental for the other as well as being an end In It·
self. A d emocratic orientation creates an atmosphere
essential for mental growth. But mental growth must attain a minimum plateau before a democratic orientation
can be had .
Dewey was not at all bothered by this apparent conflic t. He saw the process of transmitting a democratic
orientation as necessarily rational. In being rational it
fosters mental growth. A person Is required to engage in
practical action, that is, action with a practical purpose,
and to undergo the consequences of his own behavior. Ex·
periences are to be more or less unbridled. Imposition or
Indoctrination o f any sort was seen as a retarding agent.
Indeed, it was in great measure because of its ref lance on
the authority o f the teacher that progressives were opposed to traditional forms of schooling . Imposi tion and indoctrination stifled educational aims. They suppressed
mental potential and made it Impossible to foster
democracy as a way of life. Progressives holding the of·
flclal view were surely not going to allow it in their own
educational scheme.
The Dissenting View on Imposition
Other progressives saw it differently, however. They
believed the officfal view was mistaken for the same
reasons liberalism in politics was mistaken. It assumed
that rational.ity could be a fundamental force in the world,
that progress was directed by the human mind step by
step, and that the advancement o f Individual and social
welfare was g rad ual and requi red no quantum leap of
faith.
Having been thoroughly radicalized by the 1930s,
ldy di not
progressives who criticized the official view simp
39
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believe that the recognition of goodness, or what was
most desirable, was a process that was characterized by
rationalily. And later in the decade, when they witnessed
the rise of fascism, they had further confirmation they
were right. There were limits on rationality in the
educational enterprise of schooling. Dissenters con·
eluded from this that the normative thrust of the
progresslve's educational plan cannol always rely on in·
telligence. In order lo achieve his aim the progressive
teacher must sometimes employ tactics that are not them·
selves congenial to rational student choice.
Progressives like George S. Counts and John L.
Childs saw the process of understanding and accepting
an orientation to life, including a democratic orientation,
as requiring something like religious insight. And when
the process represented a change from one orientation to
another, It required something like religious conversion.
But ln neither case is intelligence enough by itself. Basic
democratic truths, like basic truths generally, can only be
seen through faith, at least in the beginning.
Take the propositions that define the democratic
outlook. We say, for example, that people are politically
equal, that every adult person should have one, but only
one vote. And we say thi s because, among other things,
we ~lleve people are equal morally as well, and that the
political realm is one wherein moral considerations must
bear. Counts and Childs saw these beliefs as much like
church dogma. They were true, and every democrat could
see why they were true, but they could not be demon·
strated or emplrlcally established as formal arguments or
scientific judgments, especially to the young or the im·
mature. To be committed to them morally and emotionally,
even to understand them intellectually, we must somehow
transcend rationality. While it may In fact be rational to ac·
cept a aemocratlc orientation and to reject any orientation
that Is not, the acquisition of democratic dispositions is a
complicated extra-rational affair, It Is rarely Itself rational.
The pedagogical distinction ~tween what we accept
rat ionally and what is rational to accept is the same as the
distinction some say is part of the philosophy of science,
the distinction between the context of discovery and the
context of verification. Once we see that a proposition is
true or false, we can set about to formulate a rational
demonstration. But the recognition or Insight Itself cannot
be explained In procedural or rational terms.
The progressives who dissented from the official
view believed that the problem of education was to get
students to understand and accept democracy as a way
of life, and that this was a process of discovery which
went beyond the bounds of Intelligence. They valued
rationality and thought it important f0< education to foster
mental capacities, but they oolieved rationality would be
valued and mental capacities would be fostered after a
democratic orientation was established, not before.
Acquisition of the orientation, they said, did not require
rationality, and Indeed, was sometimes hindered by an
overemphasis on reflection and choice. How, then, was
education to fulfill its normative thrust? Through im ·
position, of course. That is, by a process that recognized
the complicated extra-rational factors that bear on our
conceptions of reality and our acceptance of basic values.
The Controversy as a Bogus Dispute
Progressive educational thinkers never fully resolved
this dispute. And it remains something of a soft-spot In
their theoretical posture. Must it remain a soft-spot
40
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forever? I, for one, do not think so. In the first place, It
looks to me as if the dispute were more apparent than real.
Those who supported and dissented from the official view
can easily be seen as talking past one another. And if they
were, they might well have been in agreement and not
known it. In the second place, the official view rests on a
naturalistic conception of value, such that the official view
Is correct if and only If thi s conception is sound. The
theoretical posture of progressive education can be freed
from vagueness and contradiction so long as its con·
caption of value can be presented as a clear and defensible philosophical doctrine.
On the first point, could we not say that neither party
to the dispute fully understood the other? Moreover,
might we not account lor this failure by the fact that the
contending sides did not fully understand their own
position, or at least were unable to enunciate it clearly?
But, of course, we cannot say either of these things
unless we know what it was each side meant to say.
From our present vantage point, however, it seems rather
obvious. However difficult It was to formulate or express
their ideas in the original situation, it looks now as if one
side to the dispu te, those holding the dissenting view,
wished to discuss what we should teach and the other
side, those who advanced the official position, wanted to
talk about how we should teach. In most cases the two
concerns are quite d istinct, although, admittedly, the
more one pushes at their differences the harder it is to tell
them apart. We all know, for example, that the way we
teach affects what we teach; our instructional techniques
have consequences too. By teaching in a certain way, we
may foster attitudes like tolerance or Intolerance, and
these are surely legitimate curriculum concerns.
Unquestionably, It was because progressive
educational thinkers were reluctant to make a separation
between curriculum and Instruction that the parties to the
Imposition controversy continually talked past one
another and failed to formulate their particular views In a
clear and decisive manner. In refusing to make the distlnc·
tion absolute, they were making a conceptual point that
was far in advance of lhe thinking in their times. But in
sometimes acting as If the distinction could never be
made, they fell victim to an Internal dispute that cost them
dearly in public support. They were unable to present a
unified front. Instead of an Intellectual perspective that
could be linked to educational practice, people saw the
extremes of emotional slogans like those they associated
with political confrontation.
For this reason It Is unfortunate that progressives
seem never to admit a distinction between the ideas of
curriculum and instruction. Although it may always be
relative, it is still quite clear within its limits. What we
teach is one thing, how we teach is quite another. We
might explain the imposition controversy as an un·
successful effort to deal with both concerns at once.
Dewey and other supporters of the official view usually un·
derstood imposition, and always un derstood In·
doctrination, as having to do with how we should teach,
with instruction or manner of instruction. Dissenters from
the official view, like Counts and Childs, understood these
ideas in terms of what we should teach, with curriculum,
or the aims of education.
Supporters of the official view would sometimes
make a distinction between Imposition and indoctrination.
They would define imposition as the normative thrust of
education and indoctrination as a strategy, albeit inef·
EDUCA TIONAL CONSIOERA
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fective, one might employ to realize this thrust. Thus, they
would admit that the former was unavoidable and consider
it desirable when conceived as a curriculum theory aiming
to provide a democratic orientation, and they would
repudiate the latter as a scientifically unsound and
morally und esirable theory of instruction. As a theory of
ins truction they would say that it cannot transmit a
democratic orientation, and, furthermore, that it retards
mental growth.
On th is analysis Coun ts was right to say that Im·
position was unavoi
dabl
e, but wro ng to conclude that the
choice of what to impose is the o nly educat ional choice to
be made. For the conditions o f imposition, or how we Im·
pose, makes all the d ifference in the world. Whether It be
restricted or generous, authoritarian o r free, whether fac ts
and values be Ins tilled dogmatically or explained and sub·
mltted to the independent judgment of students makes
the difference between what is and is not taught. ' This is
not to deny that It is often hard to distingu ish in practice
between what and how we impose, and thus to separate
the ends of curriculum from the means of instruction. But
still there is a d istinction at work here. And the occasional
reluctance of some progressive educational thinkers to
equate imposition with Indoctrination was a recognition
this distinction must be made.
Nonetheless, It Is true that supporters of th e official
view generally saw this distinction as Counts saw It, I.e.,
as a distinc tio n without a difference. Progressives were
cance
prac tical
easy to convinc e that the point at issue lacked
and was, therefore, unworthy o f in tellec al
tu
signi fi
support. We can see this reluc tance to separate ends from
means. curriculu m from instruction, as a source of confusion in progressive education . And as a source of con fusion It can be seen as an explanation of the imposition
controversy. Thi s is not to say that the parties to the Imposition controversy were insensitive or unsympathetic to
each other's concerns. It is simply to say that the o fficial
• view on imposition was a view of instruction, and that the
dissenting view on imposition was a view of curriculum;
and that the means·ends doctrine subscribed to by bOth
parties made it dif ficult to specify th eir respective concerns. The confusion that came about made it hard for the
two sides In the dispute to c ommunicate clearly
, or, for
that matter, for each side to fully understand its own
position.
We need to be clear here ourselves. This is no t to say
that there Is anything wrong with the means-ends doctrine
In progressive thoug ht. Undoubtedly, it is one of the more,
if not the most, significant philosoph ical Insight of our
times. But the doc trine o nly claims that the separation o f
means and ends is relative and not absolute. It does not
deny the dis tinc tion itself. Participants in the Imposition
controversy seemed often to forget the difference be·
tween a relative distinction and no distinction at all. But is
it not obvious from what we know of their work as a whole
that these progressive educational thinkers held to a
distinction between curriculu m and instruc tion, albeit a
relative one? To insist they wanted to abOlish the dlstlnc·
ti on altogether simply does not make sense. To say, as the
progressives d id, that decisions o f the one sort affect
decisions of the other sort, or even that decisions o f the
one type mig ht entail decisions of the other type, Is not to
assume that the decisions are one.
The imposition controversy was by and large a bogus
dispute. Those who argued for the official view did not
mean to Imply that teachers should be neutral on critical
FALL, 1978
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questions of the day. They recognized that neutrality
would deny the normative thrust o f progressive education.
Surely no one could show they were ind ifferent towatds
the inculcation of values, or lacked a commitment to the
promotion of a d emocratic orientation through formal
education. It may well be that they saw a democratic orien·
talion, like happiness, as best achieved if not directly pur·
sued. And in this there mig ht have been a genuine dlf·
ference with their critics. Their critics wanted to do the
good by th e most direc t means. They proceeded im·
med lately to teach democracy and hoped to foster mental
capacities indirectly as a by-produc t o f democratic living .
But with the official view there was a tendency to begin by
fostering mental c apacities and ·then to teach democracy,
or even to let democracy teach Itself as a result of exer.
cising intell igence. It was as If supporters of the official
view believed that doing well, or achieving excellence or
perfection in conduc t or In practica
l
actions was a more
worthy goal than doing the good, at least as a proximate
objec tive. Doing well, or doing a good job, as opposed to
doing the good, seemed to be held out as a more reliable
gu ide for achieving moral perfection than that suppl ied by
the motive to do what was morally right.' But this emphasis on mental capacities does not deny the acceptanc e of a democratic orientation as a moral ideal. It
only indicates the s trategy adopted by those who accepted the official position. One Is no less committed to
democracy as a way of life simply because he believes it is
most likely to become a reality If pursued by a roundabout
route.
Correspondingly, dissen ters fro m the official view did
not want to claim that education was merely a process of
shaping beliefs or conditioning behavior. They accepted
restric tions on manner of teaching. The normative th rust
of education must employ moral means. Although they
emphasized teaching a democratic orientation over the
development of mental capacities, they accepted the latter as a goal of equal prominence, at least. Their emphasis, too, was one o f s trategy, not moral priority. They
simply did not believe that education could realize mental
potential in a decadent society, and that education for a
democracy must temporarily precede individual d evelopment. Bu t they never meant l hls to be interpreted as a lack
o f respect for personal integrity. Aller ,all they accepted
the means- ends doc trine too. They acknowledged the in ·
trinsic value of mental life, and knew the manner by which
it was fostered could never be Ignored altogether. And
they agreed with supporters of the o fficial view that in order to be justifi ed , a democratic orientation to life mus t
have instrumental as well as Intrinsic value. And, furthermore, they believed that In a just society we mu st all
be able to satisfy o ur spiritual as well as our material
needs. By maintaini ng this belief, they recognized that the
quality of life was as Important as Ille Itself
.
They, as well
as supporters of the official view, wanted to foster in- gence.
telli
And why was intelligence valued? Not simply
because It provided the mechan ism for self-direc tion and
control, but because it was a source ol enjoyment as well.
In the end, bOth sides to the Imposition controversy ac·
cepted the same educational goal-to free the mind from
the forces of nature that created it.
The Commitment to Ethical Naturalism
There is one last matter to discuss. In many respects
it represents the most important Issue of all . Undoubtedly,
ii deserves considerable attention, more than we will give
41
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it here. Slill, enough can be said In brief to Illustrate the
view implied by it, can only be correct If tile theory of value
essential point. On Its face. it is simple enough. Even If the
which underli es ethical naturali sm is a so und
imposition controversy was more apparent than real, It did
philosophical doctrine. Otherwise the view supporting Im·
demonstrate the commitment of progressive educational
position as a theory of Instruction as well as a theory of
thought to ethical naturalism and to the theory of value
curriculum would represent a necessary condition for ef·
inherent In ethical naturalism.
fective teaching. But ii the theory of value which underlies
Dewey and the supporters of the official view were
ethical naturalism was unsou nd, it would do more than un ·
quite clear on this. They argued that values were objective
dermlne progressive education. It would pretty much
natural properties and that they could only be known
d iscredit progressive thought generally, because
progressive thought itself is based on this theory of value.
through the intelligent analysis of experience, that Is,
through reason and empirical Investigation. This bears on
Progressive education would be inherently defective
education in a most crucial manner. For it Implies
y
literall
because progressive educational theory would be In herthat students cannot acquire and/or understand a
ently defective . And progressive educational theory
democratic orientation to life unless they engage in prac·
would be inherently defective becauoo the philosophy on
tical action and rellect on their resultant experiences.
wh ich it was based would presuppose a false conception
At times dissenters from the official view did not
of value. On the other hand, If this conception of value was
seem to recogni ze this requirement. Where they expressly
sound, progressive education would receive, perhaps, its
repudiated it, the only explanation can be that they failed
strongest support.
Suppose w e w ere to look at the imposition con·
to recognize, or would not accept, the theory of value
which underlies ethical naturalism and defines its basic
troversy as a d ispute over the means of education. In fact
it was not, but it could have been. And if It had been, it
tenets. They sometimes, perhaps inadvertently, took a
would have represented a genuine and profound
subjectlvist's position. They wou ld say, In effect, that
values have no referen ts at all, that they are a creation of
d isagreemen t. The controversy would not have been
the human will or a function of perception. At other times
limited to educational or political differences, but would
have included a philosophical dispute over the ontological
they would presuppose the first tenet of ethical
naturalism, that values are objective natural properties,
and epistemological features of values. Whether the of·
but deny the second, that they can only be known through
l lclal view, or any view implied by it, could have won out
the intelligent analysis of experi ence.
would have been contingent on the merits of pragmatism
In either case, hOwever, imposition is essential, not
itself. Without being fully aware of It, dissenters from
only in regards to curriculum, but In regards to instruction
the official view issued a challenge to the whole of the
as well. Since values are defined as having no source, no
progressive movement. During this century ethical
referents, other than human will, there is no role for in· igence
naturalism has been constantly on the defensive. II
tell
to play in their deteotlon or jus tification. They
present·day dissidents of the progressive tradition are to
are arbitrary, and if the educator wants to transmit them to
reclaim the belief that values generally, and moral values
students, he must use the means of imposition. Where
in particular, are best conceived empirically and most
subjectivity reigns, Intelligence has no place. The
readily acquired through experience and intelligent acteaching of subjective reality requires non-rational means
tion, they would be well advised to begin by considering
of instruction.
the Imposition controversy as a possible dispute over the
Even if subjectivity is denied, even if the first tenet
means to be used In schooling. If they can show that
which underlies ethical naturalism Is assumed, non·
progressive education brings out the best in peOple
rational means of instruction must still be employed so
without relying on imposition, they will reestabl ish, and
long as the second tenet is not also accepted. For even If
not just reaffirm , the faith of their intellectual ancestors.
we assume that values are objective natu ral properties, we
severely
limit or even exclude, the role of Intelligence In
,
Footnotes
their acquisition if we deny the capacity of the individual
to know them through practical action and reflection on
1. Richard H. Pelis, Radical Visions and American Dreams.
resultant experiences. It is necessary to use imposition as
New York: Harper and Row, 1973, pp. 1·95.
the means of education whenever and wherever we wish
2.
Israe
l Scheffler, The Language of Education.
to teach something to someone who, for any reason what·
Springfield,
s: Charles
Illinoi
C. Thomas Publishing Co.,
soever. cannot grasp or understand what we want to teach
1968 printing, p. 99.
through the exercise of intelligence. Values that ca nnot
3. This distinction is, of course, an old one, dating back at
be understood through intelligence would be like con·
least to the time of Aristotle. But its application and
c epts, postulates or axioms that the student was not
force in this context was made apparent to me by my
mature enough to understand. If they are to be taught,
friend and colleag ue John B. Hou gh ; but here again,
they mu st be imposed by non-rational means and on ly
only after considerable effort on his part. Perhaps, the
later, perhaps, be seen by the student as rational or
same could be said of the distinction between
necessary.
curriculum and instruction Itself.
On this point the official view on Imposition, and any
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